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Overview 
Palestine’s membership of the International Criminal Court (ICC) formally goes into 
effect April 1, 2015. As Palestinians and proponents of international justice worldwide 
await the Office of the Prosecutor’s next move, it is important to assess what heavy-
lifting the ICC could realistically undertake in the Palestine-Israel context as well as 
what other accountability avenues exist. 
Against the backdrop of Palestine’s brief yet turbulent history at the ICC, Al-Shabaka 
Guest Author Valentina Azarova discusses the current state of play regarding Palestine 
at the ICC and its potential trajectory given the Court’s practice and policy 
considerations. She also discusses Israel’s legal offensive against the Palestinian move, 
including pressure against the ICC itself, the potential for an ICC examination to further 
other accountability efforts, including those directed towards third party actors, and the 
danger that the UN Security Council may suspend the investigation. In doing so, 
Azarova addresses many of the misconceptions that exist about what the ICC can and 
cannot do – including amongst Palestinian policy makers themselves. She concludes 
with policy recommendations for a way forward. 
Palestine & the ICC: The State of Play 
The ICC was intended to serve as an international judicial body that pursues individual 
perpetrators of international crimes that “deeply shock the conscience of humanity”. 
Given its limited resources and capacity, it is expected to ensure the efficiency and 
effectiveness of its interventions in situations of conflict and mass atrocities, in order to 
combat impunity and deter acts that perpetuate conflict. 
As with any international body, the International Criminal Court (ICC) is a political 
animal dependent on state consent. It is also a normative “powerhouse” of international 
legal enforcement against individual delinquents, embodying the common interests of 
law-abiding states. To protect the ICC’s machinery, it should not be appealed to 
politically. Regrettably, all sides have subjected Palestine’s move to trigger ICC 
jurisdiction – and with it, the basic service of justice – to the politics and compromises 
of the Palestinian statehood bid. 
Palestine’s accession to the Rome Statute and 15 other treaties on January 1, 2015 was 
the latest iteration of Palestine’s statehood bid. The process began in early 2011 and saw 
Palestine gain membership of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural 
Organization (UNESCO) later that year. Palestine has now ratified or acceded to a total 
of 44 treaties and conventions, including eight UNESCO conventions in early 2012, and 
20 other treaties, including key international humanitarian law (IHL) and international 
human rights law (IHRL) instruments, in April 2014. 
The proponents of Palestine’s statehood bid framed it as a move intended to 
“internationalize the conflict,” level the playing field, and operationalize Palestine’s 
political and legal rights as a state in the international system. Most of the discussion of 
these moves has focused on their political benefits – but they also opened up legal 
channels and mechanisms which could facilitate concrete achievements if implemented 
diligently and in good faith with other states and international bodies. 
Palestinian and international human rights groups, which lauded the statehood bid for 
its potential to guarantee rights and accountability, lobbied Palestinian leaders to go to 
the ICC. They hoped it would restrain Israel’s use of force, curb its illegal conduct, and 
provide at least a nominal judicial forum for victims to hold Israeli perpetrators 
accountable. 
In fact, Palestine’s history at the ICC predates the UN General Assembly vote to accord 
Palestine non-member observer state status in 2012. Some of the 400 complaints on file 
with the ICC Office of the Prosecutor (hereinafter also referred to as “the Prosecutor”) 
were submitted by groups and individuals immediately after the 2008-2009 military 
offensive, Operation Cast Lead, in the Gaza Strip. These included complaints submitted 
by South African lawyers concerning their own nationals enlisted in the Israeli army and 
documented cases of war crimes allegations submitted by Palestinian human rights 
groups in Gaza. 
In the aftermath of that offensive, in January 2009, the then Minister of Justice Ali 
Kashan sent an official declaration under Article 12(3) of the Rome Statute to the Office 
of the Prosecutor, then headed by Luis Moreno Ocampo. The Prosecutor slow-walked 
the process into oblivion by launching an unnecessary academic debate on the question 
of Palestine’s status as a state in international law. If Palestine’s statehood status were in 
doubt, the Prosecutor should have accepted Palestine’s declaration, or referred the 
question to the Pre-Trial Chamber. 
After more than three years of deliberations, the Prosecutor abruptly issued a non-
decision on 4 April 2012 requesting that the question be settled by the UN, although 
Palestine’s statehood status had been confirmed in October 2011, when a majority of UN 
member states voted in favor of its membership in UNESCO. 
Meanwhile, Israel, France, the United Kingdom (UK), the United States and others 
pressured Palestinian officials not to trigger the ICC, which further politicized the issue 
of the ICC. Nevertheless, on 25 July 2014, PA Justice Minister Saleem al-Saqqa and 
General Prosecutor Ismaeil Jabr submitted a letter to the Office of the Prosecutor, via a 
French law firm, requesting that investigations be opened on the basis of the 2009 
declaration. However, the then Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, responded that “only the 
Head of State, Head of Government and Minister of Foreign Affairs” could express 
Palestine’s consent to be bound by the Court’s jurisdiction. The letter stated that 
Palestine’s Foreign Minister Malki, who paid a visit to the Office of the Prosecutor on 5 
August 2014, did not confirm that his government approved the request. 
To disperse misconceptions about Malki’s visit to her office in August 2014, Prosecutor 
Bensouda authored an op-edin The Guardian and on 2 September 2014 her 
office published a statement clarifying that the “alleged crimes in Palestine are beyond 
the legal reach of the ICC” because the Palestinian government had not taken the 
necessary steps to trigger the Court’s jurisdiction by either submitting a new 12(3) 
declaration, or acceding to the Rome Statute as a new State Party. 
Meanwhile, on 6 November 2014, the Prosecutor decided not to open an investigation in 
response to the referral made by the Comoros Islands under Rome Statute Article 
14 regarding the May 2010 attack by Israeli forces that killed 10 civilians trying to reach 
the Gaza Strip in the “Gaza Flotilla” (the Comoros was a flag-state for a ship in the 
flotilla.) The Prosecutor held that, despite reasonable basis to believe that war crimes 
were committed on board the vessel, the incident was not of sufficient gravity to justify 
ICC action. 
On 1 January 2015, after almost a two-year delay, Palestine sought to activate two 
triggering-mechanisms for ICC jurisdiction: It filed a new 12(3) declaration with a 
temporal scope dating back to 13 June 2014, to match that of the Commission of Inquiry 
on the 2014 Gaza conflict, and it deposited accession instruments to the Rome Statute 
with the UN Secretary General. The ICC registrar transferred the declaration to the 
Office of the Prosecutor on 7 January 2015, and the accession instrument was effected 
on 2 January 2015 to become operative from 1 April. The Office of the 
Prosecutor announced on 16 January 2015 that it had opened a preliminary 
examination on the basis of the 12(3) declaration. It should be noted that, while the 
ICC’s Pre-Trial Chamber may weigh in on the issue of statehood at some point, it is 
strictly speaking not in a position to decide that Palestine cannot accede to the Rome 
Statute. 
Statements made by Palestinian officials following the recent declaration and accession 
to the ICC – including reportsthat “the appeal to the ICC would be withdrawn if Israel 
were to freeze settlement construction” – indicate continued attempts to use the ICC as 
a political bargaining chip. However, short of Palestine withdrawing its declaration or 
accession, it has no power to reverse the move and bring the ICC’s ongoing preliminary 
examination to a halt in favor of a return to negotiations. 
It should be noted that, according to Article 16 of Rome Statute, the UN Security Council 
does have the power to defer an investigation or prosecution for a renewable period of 
12 months, if a UN Charter Chapter VII resolution is adopted by an affirmative vote of 
nine members with no vetoes. The provision, which mandates a strict construction of a 
threat to international peace and security, has only been used on two previous occasions 
(Resolutions 1422 and 1487 granting immunity to UN Peacekeepers from countries not 
party to the Statute). Yet there have been a number of other attempts to trigger the use 
of this proviso, and in the case of Palestine there are rumors that an Article 16 deferral of 
the ICC might be on the cards if a UN resolution setting parameters for a peace 
settlement is presented by France, which may be advocating one, or the US, which has 
made noises in this regard. 
The scope of the examination and any specific cases ultimately chosen for prosecution 
by are also out of Palestine’s control. For example, the Prosecutor would be unlikely to 
accept a limitation that seeks to shield Palestinians from possible prosecution or to 
consider an a-la-carte investigations menu. All wrongdoing within the Court’s 
jurisdiction in the Palestine-Israel context since 13 June 2014 may be held to account. 
In addition, there are several hurdles on the way to opening actual criminal 
investigations, including the procedural criteria considered during the preliminary 
examination phase and the substantive hurdles pertaining to the choice of specific cases. 
Procedural Issues: Palestine’s Options (and Lack 
Thereof) 
The opening of a preliminary examination by the Office of the Prosecutor does not 
indicate that an investigation is likely to follow; most of the Prosecutor’s preliminary 
examinations have been closed without opening investigations. Indeed, the Prosecutor 
opens a preliminary examination in every case referred to it. The preliminary 
examination stage consists of: Initial assessment of information; resolution of 
jurisdictional matters, identifying the location and type of crimes; considering questions 
of the admissibility of the situation and specific cases; and the effects of the Court’s 
prospective action on the “interests of justice” in the broader Palestine-Israel context. 1 
Practitioners at the Court reported an attempt by Canada, on behalf of Israel and the 
US, to launch a campaign in the Assembly of States Party to prevent Palestine’s 
accession. However, there is no official procedure for challenging accession. The UN 
treaty system has already been updated to include Palestine as the 123rd State Party of 
the Rome Statute and the ICC’s website has done the same. 
As of April 1, Palestine could submit a referral under Article 14, as a State Party to the 
Statute, to refer a “situation” without selecting specific cases; the referral’s content could 
be new, or could consist of the content of the January 2015 Article 12(3) declaration. If 
Palestinian officials attempt to direct the Office of the Prosecutor’s attention to specific 
cases, it may reject the referral. Any such referral, as is the case with a 12(3) declaration, 
would not limit the type of cases or evidence considered by the Office and is highly 
unlikely to direct the Prosecutor’s attention away from Palestinian violations. 
If the Prosecutor decides to open an investigation but decides to treat the 12(3) 
declaration as distinct from any referral that Palestine as a State Party might make after 
April 1, then the investigation would be opened proprio motu (i.e. on her own motion) 
and Pre-Trial Chamber approval would be required to proceed with the investigation. 
Alternatively, if the Prosecutor treats the 12(3) declaration as a state referral after 
Palestine’s accession becomes operative, or if Palestine submits a referral under Article 
14 with the same parameters, dating back to 13 June 2014 — no Pre-Trial Chamber 
approval is required. 
If the Prosecutor declines to investigate, there would also be a procedural difference 
between a 12(3) declaration and a referral. If the Prosecutor’s decision to decline 
investigation is based on considerations of the “interests of justice” Palestine could 
petition the Pre-Trial Chamber to initiate a “hard” review with option to reverse once it 
becomes a State Party on 1 April. If the decision not to investigate is based on 
admissibility concerns — including the lack of gravity of the situation or the availability 
of domestic prosecutions as happened in the case of the Comoros referral – the 
Chamber can only request the Prosecutor to reconsider, but cannot order it to do so. 
Experts on the court have said that the Chamber is unlikely to second-guess a 
Prosecutor decision not to investigate or to refuse to approve a Prosecutor decision to 
open an investigation proprio motu. The Chamber has never ordered the Prosecutor to 
open an investigation. As Kevin Jon Heller has remarked in relation to the Comoros 
referral of the Flotilla case: “No one quite knows what would happen if the [Chamber] 
ever ordered the [Prosecutor] to conduct a formal investigation against its will.” 
Thus, contrary to statements by Palestinian officials that Palestine needs to submit an 
article 14 referral on April 1 to direct the prosecutor to open an investigation – 
particularly into the settlements file, as reportedly said by Palestinian Foreign Minister 
Malki – the Office of the Prosecutor cannot be “forced” to open an investigation or to 
present a request to open a formal investigation to the Pre-Trial Chamber for approval. 
Nor, again, can Palestine as a State Party, post-April 1, direct the Prosecutor’s decision 
to consider investigation of some specific cases, and not others. 
Substantive Hurdles: Israel’s Attempts to Push Back 
To open an investigation, the Office of the Prosecutor is required to examine the 
admissibility of the situation under the Court’s Statute and its own policy and practice. 
The elements relevant to the case of Palestine include the principle of complementarity; 
Israel’s official refusal to cooperate with the Court; and considerations pertaining to the 
“interests of justice.” These issues should be studied and addressed in the dossiers to be 
submitted to the Prosecutor. 
The principle of complementarity gives precedence to national proceedings against 
alleged perpetrators of international crimes. Situations and cases are admissible if the 
state whose officials are responsible for the wrongful act remains inactive, undertakes 
actions that are deficient, or demonstrates unwillingness or inability (Article 17). 
The threshold used to assess a State’s unwillingness to genuinely carry out 
investigations is based on an intention to shield perpetrators, an unjustified delay in 
proceedings, or a lack of independence and impartiality or genuine intent to bring 
perpetrators to justice (Article 17(2)). Other factual indicators include: hastiness 
indicative of a desire to whitewash allegations; an insufficient number of investigations 
opened; inadequate resources allocated to investigations, reflected in deficient evidence 
gathering methods and other procedural irregularities; an insufficient degree of 
independence; and the granting of immunities with a purpose of shielding, made 
possible by deficient legislation; and grossly inadequate sentences. Notably, the Office of 
the Prosecutor has affirmed that the crime charged does not need to mirror a crime 
prescribed by the Rome Statute; serious domestic crimes will suffice as long as they 
cover substantially the same conduct. 
Israel’s track record since Operation Cast Lead of prosecuting and convicting only four 
soldiers, and issuing the harshest sentence for a case of credit card theft, would almost 
certainly be deemed by the Prosecutor as insufficient to foreclose ICC jurisdiction. 
Israel’s “Turkel II” report on investigative mechanisms for Israeli security forces has not 
led to any significant changes or any sign that the report’s recommendations will be 
implemented. 
The question is not whether Israel is “able” to conduct any investigations, but whether it 
is “willing” to do so given its long-standing legal and institutional practice, which 
includes refusing the application of IHL en bloc to Palestinian territory, extending the 
application of Israeli domestic legal jurisdiction to the West Bank, and rejecting the 
international consensus that the Gaza Strip is occupied territory. Furthermore, Israeli 
courts refuse to adjudicate certain matters, like settlement construction, through 
deference to the executive power’s positions, and Israeli law treats settlements as part of 
Israel. In addition, Israeli legal and administrative practice for certain internationally 
criminal acts such as “targeted killings,” punitive and administrative house demolitions, 
unlawful interrogation methods including torture indicate an unlawfully-expansive 
definition of military targets. 
Israel, well aware of the complementarity principle, is clearly taking steps to shield 
itself from ICC investigation. Israel’s State Comptroller, Judge Yosef Shapira decided in 
August 2014 to investigate decision-making by Israeli military and political echelons 
during Operation Protective Edge, with reference to “aspects of international law” and 
“Israel’s mechanisms of investigating complaints and claims regarding violations of 
armed conflict according to international law and determined guidelines for such 
investigational procedures.” 
In addition, on 2 February 2015, news media reported that a legal team from the Prime 
Minister’s Office, the Israeli army, and the Justice, Foreign Affairs, and Defense 
ministries, are preparing a joint report on Operation Protective Edge. 
Israel’s decision not to cooperate with the Court will present an additional substantive 
hurdle to the Prosecutor’s ability to effectively conduct investigations, choose specific 
cases and pursue alleged criminals. Israeli non-cooperation may not present an obstacle 
to open-and-shut cases – including Israel’s settlement activities, the effects of the Gaza 
blockade, and some Israeli attacks during Protective Edge. However, Israeli non-
cooperation will hinder the Prosecutor’s ability to investigate more complex cases 
concerning Israel’s conduct of hostilities in Gaza, and some of the law enforcement 
operations conducted in the West Bank. If Israel refuses to provide its version of events, 
for instance, the Prosecutor might feel unable to launch and see through a criminal 
process alleging violations of the law of targeting. 
The decision to open an investigation may in certain cases also be subject to the 
countervailing consideration of the “interests of justice.” While the Court should not 
meddle with the prospects of peace when determining the interests of justice – which 
the ICC’s very existence repudiates, and which the Office of the Prosecutor has officially 
disclaimed – it may nevertheless conclude that there are “substantial reasons to believe 
that an investigation would not serve the interests of justice” (Article 53(1)). Relevant 
considerations may include issues of crime prevention, security, and the duty to protect 
victims and witnesses. 
However, the circumstances in which the “interests of justice” may be invoked are 
exceptional. The Rome Statute apparently addresses the potential that this vague 
criterion may cause mischief by providing the Pre-Trial Chamber with the power to 
conduct a “hard” review as noted above. Given that the Court’s role is “to guarantee 
lasting respect for and the enforcement of international justice,” a narrow interpretation 
of the “interests of justice” is consistent with the Statute’s object and purpose. It is 
reasonable to expect that the Court will see the need to intervene, while treading 
carefully, in a long-standing conflict in which victims experience an accountability 
vacuum. 
The Prosecutor will also be bound to consider gravity: both in terms of the overall 
situation as well as regards specific cases. If it does open a formal investigation that 
appears defensible in terms of the gravity of the situation, it then has to decide which 
specific cases are important enough to pursue. 
What Might Some Specific Case Choices Be? 
As part of the Office of the Prosecutor’s examination of issues of jurisdiction and 
admissibility, it will seek to identify cases based on the evidence available, including 
submissions by groups and individuals. The Office will identify specific incidents and 
patterns that fit within the Court’s jurisdiction over Palestinian territory (the West Bank, 
including East Jerusalem, and the Gaza Strip), including war crimes and crimes against 
humanity. In choosing specific cases, it will also take into account considerations such 
as the gravity of specific incidents and the “contextual” requirement that each crime 
have a connection to policies and practices that perpetuate atrocities. In addition, it will 
take into account its ability to see each case through, from evidence-gathering, to 
prosecution, to bringing alleged criminals before the court, in light of its limited 
resources. 
No Prosecutor would be able to examine, let alone investigate every war crime 
committed within the ICC’s temporal jurisdiction in the Palestine situation. Yet, as 
Harvard Professor Alex Whiting, who served at the Office of the Prosecutor, aptly 
remarks, it is often made “to strike hard and nuanced balances” between pragmatism 
and principle. 
The Prosecutor’s consideration of gravity, in particular at the level of specific cases, is 
not limited to quantitative criteria. As per its practice generally, all the crimes within the 
jurisdiction of the Court are grave enough to pursue; however, which crimes are actually 
pursued is a matter of the Office’s policy. For example, despite the relatively small 
number of people killed by rockets and mortars launched into Israel by Palestinian 
armed groups in the Gaza Strip, the attacks would most probably be considered grave 
enough for inclusion among the specific cases within the overall situation, especially 
given the political significance of investigating both sides. The relative ease of pursuing 
certain cases in terms of gathering evidence that supports charges of war crimes under 
the Statute could persuade the Prosecutor to pursue these attacks along with a number 
of more complex ones. 
In the case of war crimes, the successful prosecution of high-ranking defendants 
involves showing an abuse of power and of the rule of law. In the Israeli case, the 
Prosecutor might demonstrate abuses based on domestic laws and institutional practice. 
Mark Osiel, an expert on mass atrocities, remarks that “the aim of international law […] 
is precisely to remind and exhort that our relevant normative environment is never 
exclusively that of our particular nation-state and its law.” 
The Office of the Prosecutor’s limited resources and political sensibility make it likely to 
prosecute the safest cases, legally and practically speaking. Israeli settlements – which 
involve the unlawful and extensive appropriation of land, and the direct and indirect 
transfer of the occupier’s civilians into occupied territory – are widely viewed as being 
among the soundest and strategically safe case in the Israeli-Palestinian situation. 
Settlement construction would not be possible without the legal and administrative 
machinery of state bodies, members of both the military and civilian governments. 
Private companies and individuals also play a crucial role: For instance companies 
registered with the Israeli Civil Administration (the military commander’s government 
in occupied Palestine) facilitate fraudulent land transactions that trigger “state land” 
declarations, amongst other internationally-unlawful processes of land appropriation. 
This network of public and private perpetrators is both structurally significant and 
substantively relevant to the Prosecutor’s “efficacy” consideration in choosing cases. 
A key legal question concerning the settlements case would be whether the nature of the 
criminal act of appropriation and transfer of the settler population is “continuous” for so 
long as a given settlement continues to exist, or conversely whether the only crimes 
under ICC jurisdiction would involve unlawful appropriations or transfers of Israeli 
civilians into occupied territory that occurred after 13 June 2014, the temporal 
jurisdiction ascribed to the Court (the date set by Palestine in its 12(3) declaration.) 
There is limited practice in respect of this question. 
The Prosecutor could also investigate whether a regime of apartheid results from the 
establishment of settlements and their ensuing effects – including two separate legal 
systems for Palestinians and Israelis that entrench systematic and widespread violations 
of humanitarian law. Despite the overwhelming evidence, the Prosecutor might consider 
an apartheid prosecution to be excessively novel, challenging, and politically charged. 
Since the crime of apartheid is comprised in the main of sub-sets of war crimes, the 
Office might view investigating and prosecuting the latter crimes as a sounder legal and 
political strategy, and less resource-intensive, than a case that Israel’s illegal regime in 
Palestinian territory amounts to apartheid. A complex prosecutorial agenda might also 
risk further delaying the opening of specific investigations. 
Given the temporal scope for retroactive investigations under Palestine’s new article 
12(3) declaration, the Office of the Prosecutor might examine and where appropriate 
open investigations into Israeli and Palestinian actions during Israel’s Operation 
Protective Edge in summer 2014. Here, the difficulty for the Prosecutor would be 
obtaining the facts and identifying specific Israeli decision-makers and commanders to 
ensure that prosecutions survive a criminal proceeding without being debunked by 
Israel’s counter-claims. Some cases appear to present overwhelming evidence of war 
crimes, including the targeting of specially-protected civilian objects such as hospitals, 
or the undeclared policy of targeting inhabited homes, the extensive and 
wanton destruction of high-rise buildings during the final days of the offensive, the 
Israeli army’s use of Palestinian civilians as “human shields,” and the indiscriminate use 
of heavy artillery in Rafah, Shujaiyeh, and Beit Hanoun. It is not unreasonable, in light 
of the Office’s practice, to expect that it will open investigations into difficult cases and 
gather sufficient facts to issue indictments even without Israel’s cooperation. 
Israel’s Campaign to Head Off the ICC 
The Israeli official response to Palestine’s moves at the ICC is unsurprising. Prime 
Minister Benjamin Netanyahureportedly ordered the launch of a media campaign 
against the ICC, whereas Foreign Affairs Minister Avigdor Lieberman went so far as 
to say that it should be put out of business. The Court’s leading supporters and funders, 
including Germany, the UK and France, have so far resisted Israel’s call to cut the 
Court’s funding. It is unclear what these governments might choose to do when the 
Office of the Prosecutor decides upon its next steps. 
Some commentators have warned that the Israeli campaign may not serve the best 
interests of Israeli allies like the US and Canada, or even of Israel itself. Some years after 
the US “un-signed” the ICC Statute in 2002, the US State Department Legal Advisor 
said that a cooperative relationship with the ICC ultimately served US interests because 
of the large body of international support the ICC’s enjoyed.” Whiting argued that it 
would be imprudent and counterproductive “for the US to step back from the court now 
because of Palestine.” Other experts have alsocautioned against US government threats 
to cut off funding to the PA. 
Israel legal offensive against Palestine’s accession to the ICC in fact began in 2009, when 
it set out to refute Palestine’s state status as a means of disqualifying its January 2009 
12(3) declaration. Although UN General Assembly resolution 67/19 of November 2012 
upgraded Palestine to non-member state observer, the assertion that Palestine was not a 
state was nonetheless the basis for Canadian, US, and Israeli objections to the UN 
Secretary-General, as depositary for the Rome Statute, regarding Palestine’s accession. 
Given that the Prosecutor no longer considers Palestine’s statehood an issue, at least not 
after November 2012, the Israeli legal offensive on ICC jurisdiction has apparently 
shifted to the issue of complementarity. Israel has embarked on a series of potentially 
resource-intensive, prolonged investigations into alleged wrongdoing by its forces in the 
Gaza Strip, as described above. Among other things, the Israeli army spokesperson and 
other officials have framed entire groups of the Palestinian population in the Gaza Strip 
as either voluntary or involuntary human shields, often while seeking to justify attacks 
that could amount to war crimes. 
Qualitative and quantitative research on the impact of ICC actions on unlawful harm to 
civilians, as well as Israel’s campaign to head off the ICC, indicate that the prospect of 
ICC investigations and prosecutions are part of Israel’s political calculus regarding 
Palestine. Indeed, one expert argues “Israel’s fury gives credence to the view that the 
court is […] a deeply relevant institution in international politics.” 
Beyond the ICC: A Strategy to Broaden Accountability 
The ICC is only one manifestation of the values, standards enshrined by states in 
international law. Even if the Prosecutor slow-walks the preliminary examination, not 
all is lost: Other processes of international law enforcement, some already underway, 
can benefit indirectly from the effects of an ICC examination of Israeli violations. 
Indeed, a Palestinian strategy to broaden the spectrum of international and inter-state 
accountability mechanisms and processes could ease the Prosecutor’s political burden of 
having to deal with one of the most politicized conflicts in the world. The Palestinian bid 
to ratify international treaties has opened up a range of mechanisms and processes, such 
as those available under UNESCO treaties and the UN human rights system. But much 
work needs to be done to seize the opportunities that the bid has created. 
There are substantial opportunities to hold the public and private sectors in Europe and 
North America to their own obligations under international law – as the MATTIN 
Group’s methodology has demonstrated in the context of the European Union (EU) 
inter-state relations with Israel and as affirmed by the European private sector 
divestment wave in recent years. States’ domestic regulation requires them to vet Israeli 
conduct and refuse dealings with private and public entities involved in or operating 
under illegal Israeli acts. 
The ICC’s examination of Israel’s conduct could induce third party states, companies, 
and international organizations to review their engagements with Israeli entities and 
ensure that they do not give legal effect to unlawful Israeli conduct. In some cases, third 
states could even be obliged to trigger inter-state enforcement processes to obtain 
guarantees from Israel that condition the continuation of relations. 
Actions third parties could take in relation to Israeli wrongdoing include: military, 
judicial and law enforcement cooperation, including multinational military training 
exercises (Israel’s air force was removed last October from the list of armed forces 
taking part in training exercises in Sardinia); sale of arms and parts to Israel, given the 
unlawful use of certain weapons by Israeli forces; and restrictions on the travel and 
activities of specific Israeli individuals, political, military and private, involved in 
unlawful acts. The EU, for instance, has adopted a combination of these 
measures against Russia following its illegal annexation and demographic 
transformation of Crimea and Sevastopol. 
The enforcement of international law can start with international institutions and 
norms that have concrete application in terms of obligations and enforcement measures 
in domestic law. For instance, UNESCO mechanismscould be triggered to determine 
that Israel’s large-scale looting of artifacts and illegal excavations in occupied territory 
are international criminal acts. Such determinations could then be used to trigger 
domestic processes in third states, to ensure that persons, institutions, and companies 
involved in such acts are barred from carrying out their activities and bringing 
criminally-obtained property into third party state jurisdictions. 
Outbidding the Bid: Conclusions and 
Recommendations 
Based on past practice as well as probable political considerations, some 
experts predict that the ICC may take years to open an investigation and several more to 
reach any decisions, short of declining to open an investigation. Others, like 
Whiting maintain that the Office of the Prosecutor’s “pragmatism will not last forever” 
and it “will be compelled to move forward”. Yet the heavily politicized nature of the 
Israeli-Palestinian conflict, the Prosecutor’s limited resources and the lack of state 
cooperation mean that Palestine’s trajectory at the Court might well follow those of 
Afghanistan and Colombia, where the preliminary examinations have taken 8 and 10 
years respectively.There is also the risk that any ICC action might be indefinitely 
postponed by the Security Council, as noted above, in order to restart the moribund 
peace process. The high stakes riding on the ICC’s actions mean it is crucial that 
Palestine and its supporters should act strategically. 
Palestine should realize that its interests are best served not by misconstruing the ICC as 
a political tool but rather by seeking to depoliticize the ICC’s examination of the 
situation in Palestine. It should establish a common, informed official and public 
position on the significance of the ICC as an impartial mechanism intended to provide 
the basic service of justice. A 21 January 2015 Presidential Decree established a 
Supreme National Committee responsible for ICC follow-up and for preparing files, 
consulting with international experts, and coordinating with civil society. Two 
committees were also established that include a technical and a civil society committee. 
The National Committee hascome in for some criticism for lacking solid expertise and 
clear and transparent decision making processes, among other things. Nevertheless, the 
Committee should make it a point to ensure that the Office of the Prosecutor accurately 
understands the Israeli legal system and Israel’s intrinsically deficient practice in 
applying international law. 
At the same time, the public should be kept informed. While some workshops and 
roundtables have been organized in recent weeks, the public remains largely in the dark 
about the state of play, and Palestinian official statements on the issue have varied, 
often with a counter-productive effect. 
Moreover, Palestine needs to couple a legal strategy, at the ICC and beyond, with key 
housekeeping measures that show its commitment to international law. It should ensure 
domestic conformity with international human rights law, humanitarian law, and 
criminal law through adequate legislation and institutional practice. Indeed, it is hoped 
that Palestine’s accession to the Rome Statute will promote necessary domestic 
legislative and institutional reform, and harness domestic interest and capacity to 
prosecute crimes – an effect of ICC accession known as “positive complementarity”. 
Another housekeeping issue that has yet to be adequately addressed involves the 
structure and responsibilities of the Palestinian government. There is an urgent need to 
distinguish between the PA, the government of the State of Palestine, and the Palestine 
Liberation Organization (PLO), which represents the State in its external relations. 2 It is 
crucial to clearly distinguish the actions of the PA, which are subject to political and 
circumstantial coercion by Israel, from the positions of PLO representatives who 
represent the state in its international relations. 3 Perhaps not even the settlements case 
would be straightforward if the ICC mistook the PA’s actions pursuant to the Oslo 
Accords – which explicitly provided for settlement activity in some instances, albeit 
under coercion – for acquiescence to such activity by a Palestinian government. 
The ICC’s action might indirectly help to clarify of Hamas’ position within the structures 
of Palestinian government. The question of whether Hamas, as a local government, is 
responsible under international law treaties and conventions signed by the federal 
government of Palestine is consequential, since, formally, Hamas officials are 
considered part of the Palestinian unity government. 
Finally, given that the path to ICC investigations is expected to be long and tumultuous, 
it will be crucial to garner the support of friendly states for independent ICC action. 
Moreover, the support of friendly states, and states that have enshrined their 
commitment to international law in their domestic orders will be essential to counter 
efforts by Israel and the US to politicize the issue. The EU’s Common Position on the 
ICC and the policy commitments by states to the significance of the basic service of 
justice provided for by the ICC are “essential means of promoting respect for 
international humanitarian law and human rights,” and should be the basis for 
productive exchanges by Palestinian officials and civil society to seek advice and 
expertise and bring EU Member States on side. 
Notes: 
1. The author extends particular thanks to Professor Kevin Jon Heller, School of 
Oriental and African Studies (SOAS), University of London, co-editor of Opinio 
Juris and author of an impressive body of relevant publications, for his insightful 
guidance and detailed explanations. Special thanks also go to Victor Kattan, 
Chantal Meloni, Ata Hindi, Mitchell Plitnick, and the reviewers. ↩ 
2. Palestine’s 12(3) declaration was regrettably submitted to the ICC in 2009 on 
Palestinian Authority rather than PLO letterhead. ↩ 
3. See Valentina Azarov, An international legal demarche for human rights? Perils 
and prospects of the Palestinian UN bid, International Journal of Human Rights, 
Vol 18, No 4-5 (2014). ↩ 
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